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**RESEARCH PAPER**

**Understanding Pakistan's Political Rhetoric in the Global War on Terror: A Post-structural Discourse Analysis**

<sup>1</sup>Tasawar Hussain and <sup>2</sup>Aisha Younus

1. Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, H-9, Islamabad, Pakistan  
2. Assistant Professor, School of Politics and IR at QAU, Islamabad, Pakistan

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**Corresponding Author:** pop11th@gmail.com

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**ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this study is to offer a nuance understanding of Pakistan's foreign policy in the post 9/11 context in the image of post-positivist tradition. Grounded in post-structural image and post-structural discourse analysis (PDA) this study endeavors to make sense of political rhetoric in the global war on terror. In the same vein, Pakistan's narrative on the global war on terror is unfolded. Based on the primary text of a memoir by President Musharraf, the study develops a clear understanding of how the language of identity, security and morality was employed by the then military regime in Pakistan. It argues that such a narrative was pivotal to pave Pakistan's way to participate in the global war on terror as and it was intelligible enough for the domestic and international audience. Finally, this study invites future researchers to employ the post-structural image in unfolding the complex world of politics.

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**KEYWORDS** Rhetoric, Discourse, Post-Structuralism, Identity, Security, Morality, Narrative, Intelligible, Masses, Political Reality, 9/11, Alliance, Metaphor

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**Introduction**

This study endeavors to analyze the abrupt shifts in Pakistan's foreign policy after 9/11 by employing (critical) discourse analysis. In doing so, it conducts textual analysis of the *Memoir* written by then Chief Executive and later President of the country, General Pervez Musharraf. This paper demonstrates that how intelligently and persuasively Musharraf employed the new context (September 11) and linked that to the existing national discourse of danger; that inflated when discursively connected to historically and socio-cognitively prevailing India-Pakistan enduring rivalry; Kashmir issue, nuclear assets, and overall national security threat and national interest of the state (Hanif, & Muzaffar, 2024).

It analyzes the argument that, soon after 9/11, Pakistan jumped into the US global war on terror on the constructed rationale of national security and national interest, over period of time, as the war comes inside the country, various "operations" and their media coverage further helped "threat inflation" hence, made it real matter of national security and objective political reality. This paper substantiates these claims in the sections to come by conducting textual analysis as evidence.

In particular, this paper is focused on the 'emergence, contextualization, operationalization, and recontextualization' of political rhetoric in the war on terror discourse which helped Musharraf regime to construct its case against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (van Dijk 2004). Likewise, it focuses on how Musharraf regime took U-turn from the previously held relations with Taliban regime by recontextualizing them. The new discursive construction by Musharraf provided rationale for Pakistan's participation in the global war on terror through persuasive speech acts at mass level (Fairclough 2010).

Due to limited time and space, this paper confines itself to focus on how various discourses have been employed by President Musharraf in Pakistan after 9/11 to justify his rhetoric to participate in the US-led global war on terror by looking into identity, national interest, and national security chunks in his *Memoir*. This study offers textual analysis of national security, national interest, and morality frames constructed by the Musharraf regime in Pakistan by using discourse analysis.

This paper answers two main questions: how various discursive encounters (mainly wrapped in morality, national interest, national security, and identity language) have served to construct the hegemonic political rhetoric in the US-led war on terror in Pakistan led by Musharraf regime? And, how the post 9/11 hegemonic political reality has served the interests of power elites in the US and Pakistan?

### Literature Review

This study borrows the 'critical standpoint' that "all hegemonic social and political reality is power serving, and it is always socially and discursively constructed by hegemonic power or power elites; "knowledge power relationship" (Devetak, 2012: 184). Did post 9/11 war on terror serve the ulterior motives of the US and the power elites in client state? This question can theoretically be addressed by looking into the works of various scholars like Richard Devetak, David Campbell, Lene Hansen, Johan Galtung, Michael Foucault, Noam Chomsky, Norman Fairclough and others.

Nations take birth from self-imagination of difference as Anderson (1991) rightly put, "imagined communities". On the basis of otherness, they keep on constructing their identity and national consolidation and cohesiveness. Such identity construction bases itself on number of factors, for example, morality, security, group rights, and so on. Almost all human societies inculcate system of good versus evil to their generations of citizens at early stages of education through various systems of discourses, which in turn helps morality-based political construction of otherness where political leadership associate higher moral grounds with "we-group" and immorality to "other-group" in politics of foreign policy.

The linguistic-turn in the study of international relations has analytical promise called as 'discourse analysis' borrowed by the post-positivist tradition especially constructivism, and post-structuralism. To make sense of security studies and foreign policy politics, it holds that that threats are constructed and deconstructed through speech acts by dominant actors (usually leaders). It asserts that political leaders, through their speech acts can make any problem a security problem when they declare it to be. Jorgensen summarizes the post-structuralists securitization theory as:

Securitization shows how actors try to securitize various phenomenon, including missiles, ideology, migration and climate. According to the theory, actors securitize the ordinary issues by declaring that they consider issue x, y or z an issue of security – not merely an ordinary issue of security but actually an existential security threat for which reason the employment of extraordinary means is mandatory and therefore legitimate (Buzan 1998: 24).

In addition, according to post-structuralist thread, securitization of an issue requires relevant audience, and favorable overall environment or context which helped to shape the conduct proposed by the power elites as Buzan and others persuasively

substantiate that “a threat has been constructed when an audience believes that “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant” (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 24).

Securitization theory emphasizes to note who securitizes, which issue, which [existential] threat(s) and which extraordinary means do they suggest? For example, what happened on September 11? What type of meanings President Bush associated to explain the event? What type of discursive encounters were used to name the September 11 happenings? And consequently, what identity it produced and reproduced, and whom interests it served in the wake of global war on terror?

As Beach maintains, “this theory seeks our attention to the discursive power of the leaders to construct threats to national security through speech acts that have real effects on state’s foreign policy” (Beach 2012: 93). Likewise, for Hodge, securitization also involves discursive encounters like intertextual connections involve “a process whereby a given piece of discourse is lifted from one setting—and is inserted into another setting—that is, it is decontextualized—and is inserted into another setting where it is recontextualized” (Hodge 2011: 8).

Explaining “inter-textuality” in Hodge’s words, “when a piece of discourse is moved from one context to another, it carries along “socio-cognitive aspects” of the earlier context; transformed in the new context” produce metaphoric relationship and mass-level plausibility in an entirely new context (Hodge 2011: 8). In the study of US foreign policy politics, intertextuality can be termed as promising analytical tool while conducting comparative textual analysis of foreign policy discourses.

## Methodology

Various scholars (Fairclough 1995; Dijk 2004; Halperin and Heath 2012; Lakoff 2002) have tried to operationalize discourse analysis as methodological tool in two steps. When conducting discourse analysis (DA), the analyst first, chooses a body of written work e.g., political speeches, newspapers and tries to conduct an analysis of the language of that body of work by critically analyzing linguistic strategies e.g., rhetoric metaphors, symbols, narrative, frames, composition etc., it has followed to construct particular direction or ‘reality’.

As narrated by Halperin & Heath: “in this system of analysis, texts are selected to enable the analyst to explore a hypothesized association between text features and context features” (Lemke 1998). In other words, the process involves reasoning from a particular discursive production or ‘it asks what the conditions the conditions of possibility are for particular discursive production’ (Laffey and Weldes, 2004: 28).

The second step involves details of the process through which the power of a discourse has demonstrated effects. Discourse analysis assumes that; to understand the constructive effects of discourse(s), one must put discourse in its historical and social contexts. This leads us to the next step; the process of reduction and selection that is inherent by the discourse in historical settings.

Fairclough (1995, 2005) helps to summarize Dijk and Hodges’ work in three steps; first, the emergence of social change starts with the translating and condensing of complex realities into new discourses constructed through the articulation of elements of existing discourses. In the next stride, the contestation among discourses starts which may lead to particular discourses becoming hegemonic. The third step involves—the

dissemination of discourses and their recontextualization in new organizations or institutions. Operationalization, in Fairclough's scheme stands for the enactment of discourses as new ways of interacting, their inculcation as new ways of being, or identities, their operationalization in features of the physical world (as quoted in Halperin & Heath, 2012: 316-17).

This study subscribes and strictly follows the above scheme of discourse analysis presented by Dijk 2004; Fairclough 2010, and Hodge 2011. It holds that 9/11 event provides strong base to construct the future political developments for Bush administration and Musharraf regime. In post 9/11 moments, Bush administration chose to interpret the 9/11 event to construct war fames tailored in moral and national security rhetoric followed by the Musharraf regime in Pakistan.

## **Results and Discussion**

### **Emergence and Contextualization of Hegemonic Global War on Terror Rhetoric**

After 9/11, the Bush administration reiterated the Cold War ideology-based frame of opposing power blocs to develop a new global 'coalition of the willing' against the 'global evil'. Within nine days after 9/11 attacks, President Bush decided to lead the 'world war' against global terrorism; during his Address to the Congress, he said:

This is not, however, just America's fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilizations' fight. This is the fight of all those who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom. We ask every nation to join us (September 20, 2001).

The forgoing construction develops the concept of moral authority of the government to secure American nation, and triggers public support for war on moral grounds in terms of threat to the US freedom, global fight to save American civilizations, and supreme values like pluralism and freedom. In turns, such construction had also served for the public support in favor of coercive foreign policy after 9/11 (Flibbert 2012).

Theory of conceptual metaphor by George Lakoff (2002) holds metaphor as "an analogy or figure of speech in which an implied comparison is made between two unlike terms that leads to common conclusion". Lakoff (2002) relates moral family values and role of father in implementation of moral values at the level of state. For example, after 9/11, President Bush established the metaphoric link of evil and perpetrators of 9/11 i.e. Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussain.

President Bush repeatedly stressed in his speeches on 'bad guys' inculcating message of moral responsibility of the US—moral authority to punish evil doers. President Bush declared shortly after the 9/11 attacks "we will rid the world of evil doers" in "this crusade, this war on terrorism" (Flibbert 2012: 86). The following excerpts may illustrate the discursive making of war on terror political rhetoric of Bush administration before invading into Iraq in March 2003:

The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise...we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent (Bush, NSS 2002).

Above excerpt illustrates the way political rhetoric in the speeches of President Bush had worked in the moral language and national identity discourse for example, terrorism is an act of evil, 9/11 was an act of terror, Al Qaeda, bin Laden, Taliban and – Saddam Hussain staged this act of terror; therefore, “he is evil too”, all these bad guys must be punished. Similarly, it is self-evident from the following excerpt:

In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for [our] democratic values and way of life. Freedom and fear are at war; and there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict (NSS 2002).

Above contextualization follows that; to fight against the evil is moral responsibility of the US being ‘moral and benevolent hegemonic state’ of the world and after 9/11 events, its responsibility increases manifold because Al Qaeda wants to spread evil of terrorism all over the globe, therefore, the US public must support Bush administration to exercise ‘moral authority’ to ‘punish evil doers’ in its fight of global war on terror to save the American citizens, American values and the whole world in general.

In his Address to the Congress on 20 September 2001, President Bush identified that the war on terrorism would permit no room for neutrality: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”. The call for the global war on terror was equally heard in Pakistan where it was under military rule of General Pervez Musharraf.

### **Emergence and Contextualization of Post 9/11 Hegemonic Political Rhetoric in Pakistan: Inflation of National Discourse of Danger**

In his *Memoir, In the Line of Fire* (2006), Musharraf narrates his story about the developments after 9/11 and Pakistan’s ‘rational calculation before its decision to join American led ‘coalition of willing’. Pakistan’s story starts with very next day after the ‘events’. Musharraf held that he watched the ‘tragedy’ *live* on CNN before listening phone call from the US Secretary of State Colin Powell:

The next morning, I was chairing an important meeting at the Governor’s House when my military secretary told me that the US secretary of state, General Colin Powell, was on the phone. I said I would call back later, but he insisted that I come out of meeting and take the call. Powell was quite candid: “You are with us or against us”. I took this as a blatant ultimatum...I told him that we were with the United States against terrorism, ... and would fight along with his country against it (Musharraf 2006: 201).

Emergence of Musharraf’s war on terror political rhetoric refers to threat call from the US Secretary of State Colin Powell which serves as foundation of his political rhetoric grounded in national security of Pakistan. In the following excerpts he contextualizes his political rhetoric under national-security frame and moral rhetoric. However, Musharraf’s construction of war on terror political rhetoric solely bases itself on national security frame. Musharraf establishes his case by quoting one of his military serviceman director general of Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) who was in Washington DC when 9/11 incident took place, referring to him Musharraf writes:

[He] told me on the phone about his meeting with the US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage ... Armitage added to what Colin Powell had said to me and told the director general not only that we had to decide whether we were with America or with terrorist, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age. This was shockingly barefaced threat, but it was obvious that the United States had decided to hit back, and hit back hard (Musharraf 2006: 201).

Pakistan's decision to join the US war on terror was based on the above two extracts narrated by General Musharraf. He uses words and phrases like; 'blatant ultimatum', 'shockingly', and 'barefaced threat', 'United States had decided to hit back, and hit back hard,' along with two phrases in reported speech: "you are either with us or against us", and "if you chose terrorists, then "be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age".

The words Musharraf chooses in his narration are taken from military security jargon which (psychologically) leads reader to 'close-ended situation' and 'demands' 'rational decision-making' in extreme existential-threat conditions to national security. Musharraf further constructs his rationale under 'supreme national security' and 'rational choice' frames:

I made a dispassionate, military style, analysis of our options, weighing pros and cons ... Underlying any leader's analysis has to be a keen awareness on his decision hangs the fate of millions of people and the future of his country ... My decision was based on the well-being of my people and the best interests of my country – Pakistan always comes first (Musharraf 2006: 201).

It is interesting to note that how intelligently a phone call bases analogy led Musharraf to employ the war discourse. It is also noteworthy the way he quickly jumps to "war game, and military style analysis" that he relates to the "fate of millions of people" and ends up with national security tone. Furthermore, General Musharraf shades his narration with supreme 'national security crisis' situation and takes nationalist character wrapped into "discourse of national security threat and fear", as he further adds to his rhetoric with existential threat to Pakistan:

I war-gamed the United States as an adversary. There would be a violent and angry reaction if we didn't support if we didn't support the United States. Thus, the question was: if we don't join them, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The answer was no, we could not (Musharraf 2006: 201).

Interestingly, General Musharraf constructs his whole "rational choice thesis" on the basis of the "phone call" and "indirect threat" of the US Under Secretary of State and constructs war-like situation by using terms like, "war-gamed", United States as "hegemonic adversary", and emotive terms like "violent and angry" by referring to the US hegemonic power metaphorically rationalizing his decision. Nonetheless, Musharraf's construction was plausible in the national security state of Pakistan and public took it accordingly when contextualized in the historically enduring national security discourse of Pakistan; its enmity with India and other related factors.

General Musharraf recontextualized President Bush's national security narrative and moral metaphor on the same lines, using same discursive political frames which President Bush constructed soon after 9/11. In addition, note the similarity between Bush

social narrative construction to get mass favor in war on terror by referring and reiterating to 9/11 by using September 11 as 'cognitive point of reference' to remind grave national security threat and Musharraf's narrative construction by referring to 'phone call' as national security threat. Musharraf's narrative tends to depict a situation of "no option at all" and consequent decision based on "national interest and rational calculation". The emergence of rhetoric successfully happens at this stage.

### **Discursive Employment of Insecurity Culture: National Security, National Interest, and Socio-Historical Analogy**

To make his political rhetoric strong he keeps on contextualizing (Fairclough 2010) with varied 'socially-prevailing threats', Musharraf contextualizes his narrative into socio-historical themes of 'enduring India-Pakistan Rivalry', longstanding 'Kashmir problem' (T. V. Paul 2005; Stephen P. Cohen 2004; Yaseen, et. al., 2016), and 'publicly most sensitive 'nuclear assets' to trade fear-metaphor (Lakoff 2002; Hanif, & Muzaffar, 2024a) which consequently, worked well to make his rationale plausible at public level in Pakistani society. Referring to India, Kashmir and 'strategic assets', he maintains his national security rhetoric:

I also analyzed our national interests. First, India had already tried to step in by offering its bases to the United States. If we did not join the United States, it would accept India's offer. What should happen then? India would gain a golden opportunity with regard to Kashmir. The Indians might be tempted to undertake a limited offensive there; or, more likely they would work with the United States and United Nations to turn the present situation into Status quo.

Second, security of our strategic assets would be jeopardized. We did not want to lose or damage the military parity that we had achieved with India by becoming a nuclear weapon state. It is no secret that the United States has never been comfortable with a Muslim country acquiring nuclear weapons, and the Americans undoubtedly would have taken the opportunity of an invasion to destroy such weapons... and India would have loved to assist the United States to the hilt. Third, our economic infrastructure, built over half a century, would have been decimated (Musharraf 2006; (Hanif, & Muzaffar, 2025).

The language construction in selected excerpts provides rationale for Musharraf's decision at "micro level", which in later stages helps to formulate his national security decision at "macro level" (Dijk 2004). He keeps on linking most sensitive and socio-cognitively available issues at in Pakistan society to justify his rationale "national security frame". For example, India is Pakistan's historical and longstanding enemy at mass level due to grieves and hatred: since its inception in 1947, Pakistan and India have fought more than three wars over Kashmir, second most sensitive matter in Pakistani society is religion and third is nuclear bomb.

Musharraf links all to provide metaphoric acceptance and acknowledgement at first level—the social contextualization of event (Fairclough 2010). Most surprisingly he concludes his "rational weighing" within just few hours and most interestingly he weighs his available options after giving his commitment to the US secretary of state Colin Powell on his first "phone-call".

After brilliant connections and linkage of his political rhetoric in socio-cognitively tradable fear metaphors, national security, and identity discourse, Musharraf mentions

his calculation in terms of benefits of going into war on terror. Those benefits were mainly economic and financial consideration and his wishful thinking to get rid of terrorism prevailed in Pakistan at domestic level. The 'grave national security challenge' constructed by Musharraf is comparable to the national security threat hype created by President Bush in the US immediately in the wake of 9/11.

### **Moral Metaphor: Discourses of Morality, Savage-Savior Construction, and National Interest**

The biggest challenge for Musharraf was how to transmit his 'calculations' to Pakistani society which was overwhelmed by 'religion' the concept of the "Cold War transmitted" *Jihad* (religious war against infidels) and Islamo-phobia in Pakistani society since 1979 common *Jihad* in Afghanistan against the "infidel communist ideology" led by Saudis and Pakistani military with US material support. These were gigantic challenges, it was very difficult to turn against these social and political actors which have earned lot of respect during *Afghan Jihad* (1979-89) and now were part of socio-cognitive system of individuals in Pakistan; well respected *Mullahs* (religious clerics) on both sides: Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A generation in Pakistani society and army lived on the politico-religious discourse of *Jihad*, promoted by the US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistani power elites to counter threat of communism in Afghanistan and beyond. In post-Cold War developments Pakistani policy elites strongly supported Taliban to get hold in Afghanistan to serve strategic interests of Pakistan. After Taliban regime took control Pakistan in mid 1990s Pakistan was one of only three countries to acknowledge Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

To construct a completely new political rhetoric on intelligent weighing was far easier than to inculcate the national narrative in society. First step policy-elites in Pakistan led by General Musharraf had to take U-turn from its political history of last thirty years by disowning politics of *Jihad* (actively supported by both Pakistani army and society); Taliban regime in Afghanistan, banning all religious-political 'extremist organizations' working at domestic level in Pakistan which have been raising funds to "liberate Kashmir" from 'Indian infidels' (as it was also demanded by Bush administration, for details see; Musharraf 2006: 204-5). After his decision to take U-turn, the next step was to construct "savage metaphor" (Mutua 2001) against Taliban and then to weigh it against Pakistan's national interest. The following excerpts from Musharraf's *memoir* help to decompose the morality-based narrative construction in this regard:

The ultimate question that confronted me was whether it was in our national interest to destroy ourselves for the Taliban. Whether they were worth committing suicide over? The answer was no. They were fired by a misplaced messianic zeal inculcated in them by half-baked, obscurantist clerics, a zeal that was contrary to moderate, tolerant, progressive, spirit of Islam of the majority of Pakistani people ... the peace they brought to Afghanistan was the peace of graveyard. Why should we put our national interest on the line for a primitive regime that would be defeated? (Musharraf 2006: 202).

Having made my decision, I took it to the cabinet. As expected, there were some concerns from the ministers that they had not been consulted. Doubts were also expressed in the corps commanders' meeting that followed. In both meetings I went over my analysis in detail...and everyone was on board. I then went on



national radio and television on September to explain my decision to the people (Musharraf 2006: 206).

### **Operationalization and Internalization of Post 9/11 Hegemonic Discourse in Pakistan**

General Musharraf then starts a massive campaign to pave public opinion employing his political rhetoric on the basis of national security wrapped in patriotic slogans. Famous singing bands in Pakistan helped to make patriotic tones, concerts were arranged and a new national slogan was constructed "Pakistan First" justifying Pakistan's national security based on the rational decision to participate in the war on terror; the theme was later converted in an (Urdu) national-patriotic song "Sab say Phelay Pakistan", English translation "Pakistan First", this song was played hundreds of time on the only available state television *PTV* (at public-level before 2002) to disseminate the political rhetoric in society in a "soft way". Musharraf's campaign remained very successful due to its emphasis on national security themes as he goes on:

Then I began meeting with a cross section of society ... I met with intellectuals, top editors, leading columnists, tribal chiefs, students, and leaders of labor unions ... Then I went to military garrisons all over the country and talked to soldiers. Everyone was rightly concerned that if Afghanistan was bombed, many innocent Muslim lives would be lost (Musharraf 2006: 206-7).

As mentioned earlier, the most daunting challenge was how to eradicate the "Jihadi tone" from socio-psychological set up of society that was deeply wrapped in religion, history and political culture as well as strong ethnic and family linkages of Pakistan with Afghanistan. General Musharraf had already decided to emphasize on "Pakistan first" and to demonize Taliban and Osama bin Laden so, he kept on constructing "savage metaphor" against Taliban in his political rhetoric:

The United States, I suspect, did not disapprove the Taliban phenomenon for the same reason we did not – the Americans hoped that the Taliban could bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. We have strong ethnic and family linkages with Taliban (Musharraf 2006: 211).

Taliban were never smooth, in fact they were quite uncomfortable. We could only watch in horror as the Taliban unleashed the worst abuses of human rights under the cloak of their own particular interpretation of Islam ... Once, visiting players of Pakistani football team were arrested by the Taliban government for wearing shorts during game, and their heads were shaved as punishment. The Taliban refused to allow women to step out of their homes, even to go to market, and refused to allow girls to attend schools. They were infamous for torturing adulterers and murdering their enemies (Musharraf 2004: 212).

In the above excerpts Musharraf goes on to construct "savage-savior metaphor" (Makau Mutua 2001) by using extreme ethical jargon which construct an immoral or even savage picture of Taliban especially words given in the above box; "horror, worst abuse of human rights, religious cloak, murderers" against the brutality of Taliban to demonize them publicly; the ethical frame he applies is noteworthy. Using of moral and ethical metaphors which leave very negative effects in the mind of reader and listener may be noticed in the extract given above in the story of Pakistani football team. At mass level, the construction of "savage and victims" triggers the demand of justice and moral requirement of "savior" in such cases (Mutua 2001).

Referring to the deficiency of political awareness about 'real world' in the Taliban and Mullah Omar, Musharraf ridicules Taliban when he refers to Pakistan's efforts to persuade Taliban regime to hand over Osama bin Laden to American to avoid possible military strikes on Afghanistan which may have strong impacts on Pakistan being 'Muslim brotherly state', religious frenzy Mullah Omar refused. He maintains that it was unimaginably difficult to convey the "realities of real world":

The impact of 9/11 was lost on Mullah Omar and Taliban. "It was God's punishment for the injustices against Muslims", Mullah Omar said God was on their side and Osama bin Laden was superman. Thus, negotiating with Mullah Omar was more difficult than one can imagine. It was like banging one's head against a wall ... thus as we did, we could not persuade Mullah Omar to let go of Osama in the window available before October 7, 2001, the dead line imposed by President Bush (Musharraf 2006: 216).

Note the similarity of the moral metaphor implied in the political rhetoric of President Bush when he uses the "savage metaphor" (Mutua 2001) to construct a moral and fear frame against Taliban, Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussain by metaphorically linking them to "evil", grave threat to "civilization" and "struggle between liberty and totalitarianism" similar to the Musharraf's 'moral reasoning'. Musharraf recontextualizes Bush's moral frame in new context after 9/11 in a discursive way which provides moral reasoning to act against these 'barbaric' people involved in the 'worst violation of human rights' led by the moral authority of General Musharraf inside Pakistan, which metaphorically implies Musharraf's decision to be part of global 'coalition of willing' as moral and plausible decision, to fight against immoral Taliban regime and Al Qaeda 'everywhere' in the world.

### **Recontextualization and Name Calling: Translating the Rhetoric into Objective Social and Political Reality**

A series of political developments in Pakistan after 9/11 at the domestic-level helped the political rhetoric of General Musharraf to internalize and operationalize (Fairclough 2010, Dijk 2004, 2008) in Pakistani society. The chain of terrorist activities in Pakistan after 9/11 domesticated war on terror political rhetoric of Bush and Musharraf in socio-cognitive way. It started from the kidnapping episode of South Asia Bureau Chief of the *Wall Street Journal* Daniel Pearl on January 23, 2004 in Pakistan. Musharraf took advantage of this event to politicize in favor of his rhetoric and link that with moral metaphor:

I was incensed when I learned of this, disgusted that these criminals were distorting a religion of peace and beauty and using it as a cloak for their sins, Islam places the highest emphasis on the rights of the human being regardless of class, or creed and condemns murder and suicide as very great sins...After investigations Daniel Pearl found to be killed by Al Qaeda in Pakistan (Musharraf 2006: 222-24).

The above excerpt from the *Memoir* of President General Musharraf helps to understand the advancement of political rhetoric from contextualization to operationalization. The language he uses to explain the kidnapping of Daniel Pearl matches with his earlier depiction of Taliban in the language of "savage" construction in ethical and religious language when he uses words like, "criminals", "distorting religion

of peace and beauty”, cloak for their “sin”, “Al Qaeda in Pakistan”. In this way, Musharraf sells his “moral” theory about Taliban.

A series of terrorist activities started in Pakistan from early 2002, involving; kidnappings, killings, suicide attacking on schools, Mosques, Churches, hospitals, funerals, military garrison and bases, civil and military institutions, suicide killing attempts on President, Prime Minister, serving generals and the subsequent anti-terrorist operations in northwest of Pakistan engaging 80,000 security forces, all these concluded in death toll of more than 40,000 innocent citizens of Pakistan and material loss of \$20 billion in all. Thousands of families displaced, a complete chaos in tribal areas in North-West of Pakistan i.e. South Waziristan 2004, 2009 and settled areas i.e. Swat 2007, 2009, was witnessed during the military operations and subsequent counter attacks from terrorists which spread all over Pakistan (Musharraf 2006: 237-274).

The anti-terrorist military operations launched after 9/11 in Pakistan also got moral currency in their titles i.e. “Path to Salvation, Operation Right Path, constructed in religious concepts and moral tones. Once more, Musharraf’s moral construction of military campaigns against Al Qaeda and Taliban is comparable with the “ethical” and “moral” titles of Bush administration’s military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq i.e. “Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan 2001”, “Operation Iraqi Freedom 2003”.

These activities helped the political rhetoric of General Musharraf to get internalized swiftly in Pakistani society and with the passage of time a rise was noticed in public opinion subscribing to the war on terror political rhetoric of General Musharraf. Almost all post 9/11 terrorist activities in Pakistan after 9/11 were either ‘proved’ to be done by Taliban and Al Qaeda or Taliban themselves claimed for the responsibility in terms of “revenge” for Pakistan’s participation in the US war on terror. The contextualization of these terrorist activities in terms of their linkage with Taliban publicly or socio-psychologically confirmed the “savage metaphor” of Musharraf which he constructed after 9/11 for Taliban as mentioned earlier (for details see; Musharraf 2006: 204-205, 222-274).

After series of “terrorist activities” and “counter-terror activities” spread over the period of more than ten years, including many battles between Taliban and Pakistani security forces in North-West of Pakistan i.e. Waziristan and Swat, Musharraf’s political rhetoric successfully became hegemonic (Fairclough 2010), naturalized at macro-level in terms of strategy (Dijk 2004, 2008) and accepted socially as given reality (Lakoff 2002).

This internalization process arrived with metaphoric link of all terrorist activities inside Pakistan and great loss of human lives to the “savage and barbaric” Al Qaeda and Taliban. In comparison, Musharraf’s whole story seems similar to the American one—when Bush administration after 9/11—metaphorically linked its intervention to in Afghanistan and Iraq to get revenge of 9/11 which “evil” Al Qaeda, Taliban, and Saddam Hussain had planned against the US

## **Discussion**

Under the forgoing theoretical lens, this paper asserts that Pakistan under General Musharraf not only followed the hegemonic political rhetoric of the Bush administration but also its discursive strategies like danger, identity, national security, morality and so on. Ultimately, it served the hegemonic political interests of the sole super power on the one hand, and by doing so it has also served political interests of

military regime on the other hand. And all the political activity of President Bush and General Musharraf was done by successful and intelligent employment of language through persuasive discursive encounters with strong national security and moral rhetoric.

This foregoing textual analysis has illustrated that language plays an important role in political discourses and there is role of political power too in reiterating political discourse through media which consequently becomes hegemonic discourse. Many discursive factors are substantiated in the earlier part of this paper including the emergence, contextualization, operationalization and recontextualization of post 9/11 political discourse in Pakistan. It has illustrated that discursive construction of political discourse through socio-cognitive processes in which metaphorical socialization, values system, and nationalism played a vital role.

Coming back to the very prudent question raised in the beginning; why Musharraf agreed to participate in the US war on terror on the first 'phone call' from Washington, and why media reproduced Musharraf's narrative. The answer lies in personal gains and material factors. As mentioned earlier, General Musharraf was a military dictator, socialized in typical military environment; indoctrinated and obsessed with national security jargon which prevails historically in Pakistan army about insecurity from traditional national enemy.

In terms of personal interest, Musharraf wanted to extend his stay and political legitimacy at the international level because he came into power by a military coup, and arguably, he was insecure domestically due to a legitimacy gap which he tried to fill with international legitimacy by participating into the global war on terror. He might have calculated that his unconditional would be very promising on number of reasons attached which later on proved right. First, he got 'legitimacy' to stay in power, second, as being highly ambitious he thought by participating into the US war would enable to get US aid for economic and military development third and closely associated to the second was 'military-mind heroism'.

Being over ambitious, he was trapped by military-style heroism, for his personal fame and heroic history, he wanted to show his performance in economic sphere to beat the performance of political government which in turn, made his stay stable in power and public legitimacy to rule for longer period. To prolong his stay in power was his ultimate desire which he later proved by disowning his own words when asked for leaving one office, either President or army chief.

The US being the sole leader of 'free world' and self-acclaimed champion of liberal values and democracy not only helped legitimate dictatorship in Pakistan, witnessed the fraud referendum in 2002 to elect President Musharraf for next five years; what all Bush administration did consider was its interests in the region and the Musharraf's willingness to cooperate with the US the way they like, therefore, it preferred stability over change in Pakistan and on the contrary change over stability in Saddam's Iraq.

Nonetheless, Musharraf was very successful in getting whatever he planned; to indulge the public attention in war on terror on the one and out showing in economic development statistics due to foreign aid, but with one little problem and that was his poor handling of active judiciary in Pakistan. In addition, with a proactive role in war on terror (which he got ultimately when President Bush mentioned him in one of his State

of the Union Address by praising his cooperation), he might have been able to extend his stay in power, which he did by remaining in power for nine years or so. Last but not least, Pakistan also got \$10 billion as a coalition support fund in the first five years and about \$10 billion more in the subsequent years.

Moreover, Pakistani media also disseminated the political rhetoric of General Musharraf which he constructed, contextualized and operated in post 9/11 political environment. Media took the dominant political rhetoric of General Musharraf to explain the 'new environment' using the existing dominant themes in Pakistani politics and society (Scheufele 1999; Fairclough 2010; Dijk 2008). Furthermore, When General Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999 by a military coup there was only one state television, *PTV*, publicly available in Pakistan along with varied genres of local and national newspapers.

General Musharraf started to encourage private electronic media channels in Pakistan in the period after 9/11. Media started to follow the government in the war on terror as Musharraf framed his political rhetoric in 'national interest' and 'national security'. Musharraf also took media persons "on board" "after making his decision" to go into war on terror on the US side, and successfully persuaded all of them (see Musharraf 2006: 206).

All mainstream national electronic and print media, intellectuals, civil and military elites, parliament, and leading military-run think tanks subscribed to Musharraf's political rhetoric based on "national security" and later political developments in terms of "internalization of the war on terror" which Musharraf names "war comes to Pakistan", which "practically" substantiated his 'rhetorical take' about Taliban after 9/11 (Musharraf 2006: 222-36).

Undoubtedly, media remains news hungry and live on news (Norris, Kern and Just 2003). In Pakistan's case, Musharraf very generously facilitated the cable TV network (CTV) in 2002 and the idea was to increase the indigenous media outlet to spread the post 9/11 hegemonic political discourse as much as possible. The print media and corporate elites were waiting for such economic opportunity that ultimately served their corporate interests. Ultimately, the interests of media and the Musharraf regime converged and the minds of Pakistani public were fully exposed to the war on terror political rhetoric to the maximum possible level.

In nutshell, political interests of Musharraf and Bush did converge in the wake of September 11 events. President Bush wanted Pakistan's support to launch post 9/11 global war on terror in Afghanistan and for that matter he needed Pakistan's logistic support and will to cooperate. President Musharraf was desperate to support the US for its political survival and to deliver his post-coup economic development promises; for these; the US was the best choice and post 9/11 environment was the best opportunity.

## **Conclusion**

The paper substantiates that it is not solely based upon structural factors/the nature of international order or power distribution which decision making elites follow the way structural realism asserts, what they consider most is interests of power elites. Power elites channelize through discursive encounters with the help of hegemonic power to disseminate their political rhetoric later chipped by military and economic power to internalize their rhetoric globally.

It has been demonstrated that in post 9/11 environment, ideational and material interests were expressed and successfully achieved through intelligent use of language, i.e. political rhetoric and media discourse in the US and Pakistan (Richardson 2007). For instance, the present study has established the role of linguistic based social categories in the war on terror which were constructed through intelligent use of language, which finally helped the Bush administration in the US and Musharraf regime in Pakistan to pave the way for their desired goals.

This study concludes that the global war on terror is discursively constructed political reality and it was purposefully meant to serve the ulterior motives of the hegemonic power of the world. The role played by the power elites in Pakistan was also to serve the political interests of the military regime, by doing so, the course of action followed by the Musharraf regime was identical to the world hegemon. In nutshell, the political and economic interests of power elites on both sides converged which transformed the hegemonic political rhetoric as a given reality through various discursive encounters in Pakistan the way it happened in the US.

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