



RESEARCH PAPER

An Insight into the Early Phase of the Constitutional and Political Development of Pakistan (1947-54)

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ABSTRACT

The dominance of the executive wing over the political organ of Pakistan is an endemic phenomenon whose roots might be traced in the very beginning of the country as an independent state. Although M. A. Jinnah was a skilled lawyer blessed with some God-gifted abilities required to comprehend the affairs of the complex socio-political structure of British India mainly dominated by orthodox religious outlook but he too had to exclusively rely upon the civil bureaucracy during the early phase of the country since his colleagues from the political wing remained busy in settling petty political feuds. His immediate deputy, Liaquat Ali Khan, even, had to seek help from PRODA to keep the political and administrative houses in order. The international actors were also keenly interested in the affairs of the country because of its geo-strategic significance. Collectively, these factors paved the way for an unending dominance of civil-military bureaucracy which was trained and skilled by the British Government thus very well-acquainted with the technique of pleasing their real masters. In that background, the instant study analyzes the reasons for the political instability in the early phase of the history of Pakistan and finds that civil-military collaboration remained very much dominant over the political wing which hampered the decision-making process in terms of constitutional and political development of the country. The qualitative method of research is applied to explore the results.

KEYWORDS Civil-Military Bureaucracy, Constitutional Development, Leadership Crisis, Pakistan Politics, Political Development

Introduction

The partition of the subcontinent into two states of India and Pakistan was agreed upon by the British Government under the June 3rd, 1947, Plan and the state of Pakistan was established under the two Acts of British Parliament *i.e.* Government of India Act, 1935 (amended), and The Indian Independence Act, 1947. A Constituent Assembly was set up for framing the Constitution for Pakistan which was initially consisted of 69 members, but after some necessary additions, its strength was increased to 80. Since Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor-General of Pakistan, had a different conception of the role of Governor-General than that which was generally conceived and accepted in other Commonwealth countries hence he refused to take the oath of his office in the generally accepted form which required 'to bear true faith and allegiance to His Majesty', and by agreement with the British Sovereign, the oath which he took required that he should bear 'true allegiance to the Constitution and be faithful to His Majesty'. In that way, Mr. Jinnah replaced the theory that the Governor-General could hold his office as long as he enjoyed the confidence of His Majesty with the theory of holding the office of the Governor-General as long as he enjoyed the confidence of the people. Furthermore,

as the Governor-General of Pakistan, he didn't wish to accord assent to Bills 'in His Majesty's name' (Choudhry, 2006:44). It is also worth-noting that, after independence, Mr. Jinnah re-inserted in the Constitution Act the authority of the Governor-General to dismiss the Provincial Governments at will, which authority was withdrawn by the British prior to the independence in response to the pressure exerted by the Indian National Congress (Newberg, 1995:37).

Constitutional Advancements

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan had somewhat complicated and complex task of framing a Constitution for a country consisting of two wings which were different not only in terms of race and culture but also physically separated by the Indian territory to the tune of 1500 km. In those circumstances, the Constitution to be framed needed to be equally acceptable for the people and elite belonging to those distant and distinct wings. Preoccupation of the Constituent Assembly with problems connected with the establishment of a new state and the mass migration which followed the partition caused a substantial delay to take up the said task which eventually added to its complexity and complications (Shah, 1986:7). After a lapse of 19 months, Liaquat Ali Khan moved the Objectives Resolution which was passed by the Constituent Assembly on 12th of March, 1949. Referring to the Islamic principles of justice and equality, that Resolution laid down the objectives and principles on which the upcoming Constitution was to be based. The said Resolution has remained the part of all the three Constitutions framed so far in Pakistan. Paula R. Newberg offered an interesting comment about it in the following words:

"The Resolution proposed Government under the guidance but not the instruction of Islamic Principles, acknowledged unspecified autonomy for the units of the Federation and guaranteed Fundamental Rights for the majorities and the minorities alike. It thus tried to combine federalism, democracy and minorities alike.....The Resolution's generality could not hide profound disagreements about the character of the future Constitution of state---for example, its characterization of the role of Islam was made simultaneously prominent, obscure and legally undefined. Its grounding power for Constitution-writing has been emotional rather than practical, inertial more than assertive (Newberg, 1995:22)."

After the approval of the Objectives Resolution, the Assembly constituted a Basic Principles Committee which had to chart out the main principles on which the future Constitution of Pakistan would have to be based (Shah, 1986:7). The said Committee presented two reports respectively in 1950 and 1952, both of which attracted serious objections from either wing of the country. However, the Bogra Formula, presented in 1953, by the then Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra, received better response and was finally adopted by the Constituent Assembly in October 1954 (Choudhry, 2006:95). On 1st of October 1954, Mr. Bogra announced that the Constituent Assembly would finalize the constitutional work in the coming December, which announcement was repeated on 23rd October 1954 (Newberg, 1995:42) but the Assembly was dissolved on the very next day by the Governor-General.

Political Advancements

During the transitional arrangements, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as the 1st Governor-General of Pakistan, exercised the real executive power. After his eternal departure on September 11, 1948, the most potential person to succeed him was Liaquat Ali Khan, the 1st Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, instead of succeeding Jinnah as

Governor-General, Liaquat chose to remain Prime Minister which meant that the cabinet form of government would have to be the main feature of the future Constitution (Choudhry, 2006:44). After Jinnah, Khawaja Nazimuddin became the Governor-General of Pakistan who already had played a significant role in the freedom movement of India and was the Chief Minister of East Bengal till Jinnah's death. Because of his nobility, he was highly respected by his colleagues and others (Ahmad, 2004: 154). In order to control the internal political disturbances in the provinces, Liaquat Ali Khan enforced the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA) in January, 1949. Under it, the judicial proceedings against the politicians for misuse of power could be initiated on behalf of the Governor-General or Governor; the guilty might be disqualified for serving in any public office for a maximum period of ten years (Rafique, n.d.:117). The said Act was an effective tool to control disorder and disturbances and it lasted deep repercussions for the future political developments in the country.

On October 16, 1951, Liaquat was assassinated in a public meeting at the Company Bagh Rawalpindi (later named as Liaquat Bagh). Four days prior to the incident, he removed Malik Ghulam Muhammad from the Cabinet (Ahmad, 2004:151) but on latter's request reversed his decision. He had made-up his mind to remove Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani as well but was killed before doing the needful. Both of them were present in Rawalpindi at the time when the incident took place, but didn't attend the Liaquat Bagh's meeting (Rafique, n.d. 131). It is believed and somewhat supported by the later events that Liaquat's assassination was engineered by the then establishment mainly dominated by the Punjabi elite and supported by some international elements as well, hence the incident proved a turning point in the history of Pakistan. *(For a deeper insight into the murder story, please read "The mystery that shrouds Liaquat Ali Khan's murder", by Akhtar Balouch, published in daily Dawn, October 16, 2015. Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1213461>, Also Read M.S. Venkataramani's 'The American Role in Pakistan', Vanguard, 1984, printed at Lahore; also see Special Note about The Assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, released by CIA on 29/08/2000. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79S01011A000500060007-2.pdf>...The report indicated Ghulam Muhammad as one of the possible successors of Liaquat which later became true. It may be very safely analyzed that the clenched fist of Liaquat was the chief reason behind his assassination. Pages 158-160 of Venkataramani's book carry some interesting relevant details.)*

Before partition, Ghulam Muhammad was an officer in the Audit Branch of the Indian Civil Service, who, at the time of Independence, was serving as Finance Minister of Hyderabad state. Owing to his experience and expertise in financial management, Jinnah inducted him in the first Cabinet of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2004:186). After the assassination of Liaquat, Nazimuddin, the Governor-General of Pakistan, was persuaded by Ghulam Muhammad and others to step down as the Prime Minister while Ghulam Muhammad was elevated to the position of the Governor-General. It is believed that Nazimuddin's appointment as Prime Minister was the part of a conspiracy because after Liaquat's assassination he was the only potential political leader enjoying somewhat of a national stature owing to his knowledge and experience of the parliamentary practices. But he was also a noble person as well as a weak administrator, who might continue as Governor-General to act as a ceremonial head of the state and would not be able to control the Punjabi parliamentary group and the Bengali group either as required by the then establishment. It is interesting to note here that at the Liaquat's assassination and Nazimuddin's relegation, there was some wall-chalking in Karachi reading "dual murder of the Prime Minister and the Governor-General".

Later events proved that Ghulam Muhammad was appointed as the Governor-General to play a vital role in the early years of Pakistan's existence. The newly appointed powerful and ambitious Governor-General 'who had no respect for or training in Parliamentary procedures, tradition or convention' (Choudhry, 2006:44) could easily dismiss Prime Minister Nazimuddin on one pretext or the other. Unfortunately, that pretext was eventually provided by the Punjabi elite in the form of the Punjab disturbances (Anti-Qadiani Movement) when Lahore was put under the Martial Law in March 1953. In April, Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Nazimuddin's cabinet on account of its failure to address the problem of food shortage, lacking more vigorous action on the general economic problems of the country and the maintenance of law and order (McGrath, 1996:96) *(It is worth-noting here that almost similar pretexts were relied while dissolving the democratic governments in Pakistan of 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996 which shows the uniformity of the bureaucratic mindset; for a detailed study please consult "Role of Judiciary in the Constitutional and Political Development in Pakistan-A Compilation of Important Constitutional Cases (1954-2000), compiled by the writers of the instant study and published in 2023 by Fiction House, Lahore)*. While briefing Washington about the event, the American ambassador described Nazimuddin's dismissal as 'one of the most popular coups in history' (Jalal, 1989:179). After his removal, Nazimuddin approached the British High Commissioner with the request to transmit the dismissal of Ghulam Muhammad to Her Majesty, but the latter declined to do the needful (Ahmad, 2004:167).

Meanwhile, Ghulam Muhammad had increased his influence over the Assembly and internally constituted his own kitchen-cabinet. He had also developed close ties with the military bureaucrats like Iskandar Mirza (an ex-army official) and Ayub Khan (the then Military Chief) (Ahmad, n.d.:5). Ghulam Muhammad appointed Muhammad Ali Bogra as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan, who, by then, was serving as Ambassador to the United States and was not a member of the Constituent Assembly. He was summoned to take the oath as Prime Minister and was also provided with a list of the cabinet members proposed by the Governor-General (Rafique, n.d.:144). According to Bogra, his nomination as Prime Minister was a surprise for him, too (interview of Bogra by Shicago Tribune, cited by Ahmad, 1970:48). Interestingly, that reconstituted cabinet of Muhammad Ali Bogra had six members of the outgoing cabinet hence it could be concluded that Nazimuddin was the only person who was sacked by Ghulam Muhammad. The Muslim League parliamentary party welcomed the action taken by the Governor-General (Rafique, n.d.:145) and lined up behind Bogra to elect him as the new Leader of the House and the President of the Muslim League, too (Rizvi, 1986:63). Moreover, after five months of that dismissal, when the Assembly met for the first time, there was even no discussion or debate about the said events (McGrath, 1996:111).

Constitutional Coup

Bogra, being a new entry and alien to the party politics, had no real control over the affairs of Muslim League and its parliamentary party (Rafique, n.d.:150) whereas Ghulam Muhammad was now exercising powers similar to those exercised by Jinnah. Though the assembly validated the new appointment made by the Governor-General but some of its members still had reservations against the dismissal of the previous Government and there was an ever-growing impatience within the Assembly about the arbitrary exercise of authority by the Governor-General. Nazimuddin, too, while working in collaboration of Fazlur Rehman, a Bengali leader and a long-time foe of Ghulam Muhammad (McGrath, 1996:98), had formulated a powerful group inside the Assembly. In that background, the conflict between the Governor-General and the Muslim League party members took a dramatic turn when the Assembly proceeded to pass a Bill to the effect of amending sections 9, 10, 10(A), 10(B) and 17 of the Government

of India Act, 1935 (Newberg, 1995:41). The purpose of the said Bill was to assert the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly through strengthening its ties with the cabinet. On 20th September, 1954, the Bill was introduced by A.K. Brohi, the Law Minister, which was approved on the very next day, albeit in a hasty manner, when the Governor-General, being on a foreign tour, was absent from the capital (Rafique, n.d.:150). Concurrently, on 21st September, 1954, the Assembly also approved an old Bill which was moved by Mr. Hashim Gazdar in 1951 intending to repeal the PRODA. Hence, the new law deprived the Governor-General of his power which he had been utilizing against the politicians (Ahmad, n.d.:425).

Under the newly enacted laws, the Governor-General was now bound to appoint a Prime-Minister from within the existing members of the Assembly who commanded a majority vote as well as to act in accordance with the ministerial advice. The appointment of ministers could also be made now only from within the existing members of the Federal Legislature. Moreover, the Cabinet was now turned collectively responsible to the Assembly (Shah, 1986:11). Apparently, the purpose of those amendments was to give “legislative sanction to certain accepted principles and conventions connected with the formation and working of Government in a Parliamentary system of Government.....(McGrath, 1996:123)”. For the growth of Parliamentary system, the significance of those amendments could hardly be denied but the way the desired results were achieved might be termed as “constitutional coup” (Choudhry, 2006:107). As a consequence of the above-mentioned developments, Ghulam Muhammad was left with no option but to act entirely on the advice of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, as far as the law was concerned (Ahmad, 2004:170) but the Prime Minister and members of the Constituent Assembly had altogether ignored the fact that there was a substantial difference and gap between the “constitutional provisions” and “constitutionalism”. The former were contained in the articles and clauses of the Constitution whereas the latter required a parliamentary culture, temperament and due respect for its fundamental principles and cannons. It is interesting to note that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, while drafting the original constitution of 1973, ensured that the supremacy of the parliament, the powers and status of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the autonomous jurisdiction of the provincial governments and a clear/unambiguous restraint on the armed forces to capture power must be provided by the constitution in black and white, nevertheless, neither he himself nor the other state-actors paid any homage to a culture which required respect and adherence to the constitutional provisions and putting them into practice. Since Bhutto himself was always reluctant to implement the Constitution, his own brain-child, in its letter and spirit hence it was no surprise when General Ziaul Haq, while talking to a foreign journalist, declared that the Constitution was no more than a collection of few pages and, whenever desired, he could tear them off at his own pleasure.

We have referred to the situation in the country during 1970s to highlight the fact that, in 1950s, when the country was in the very initial phase, the establishment comprising of civil and military bureaucracy with the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad (a former bureaucrat) as their focal person could hardly be expected to show any respect for the Constitution and letting the Constituent Assembly assert and consolidate its supreme authority over the other institutions hence, although, upon his return, Ghulam Muhammad did not object over repealing of PRODA and offered to remove even the earlier disqualifications imposed by him under the said Act (Newberg, 1995:41) but it was quite natural that, being ambitious enough and having no respect for the Parliamentary fundamentals, he was not willing to welcome the curtailment of his discretionary powers by the Assembly which was going to approve the final Draft

Constitution on 25th December that year which would cause the reduction of the future role of the Governor-General to that of a mere figurehead (McGrath, 1996:118). In fact, it was reported that the Minister briefing the Governor-General about the said amendment had to pocket a bundle of abuses (Ahmad, n.d.:426).

The Governor-General and his allies took the said move of the Assembly as an intrigue against them and, in retaliation, planned for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (Rafique, n.d.:151). While the Assembly was out of session and the Prime Minister was on a tour to the United States along with General Ayub, the Governor-General found the field open to strike back before the Assembly could resume its task. The pretext for his retaliatory action was found in the outcome of the provincial elections of East Bengal (1954) where the majority party (Muslim League) had to meet a remarkable defeat which somewhat had eclipsed its mandate at the federal level (Shah, 1986:10). The Governor-General knew that at that eve, none else but Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy, a celebrated Bengali leader, had remarked that the Constituent Assembly had lost its national representative character (McGrath, 1996:118) because its majority party could no more represent the people of East Bengal. At the time when the Governor-General was ready for his retaliatory action, Suharwardy was hospitalized in Europe. The Governor-General allegedly arranged his interview with Z.A. Salehri, a Pakistani journalist (Rafique, n.d.:151) wherein Suharwardy reiterated his demand for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (Ahmad, n.d.:427). Accordingly, Ghulam Muhammad summoned Bogra and Ayub back home from the foreign visit. He also sent Iskandar Mirza to escort Bogra from London thus preventing his meeting with a delegation of the Constituent Assembly who had traveled to London to inform Bogra that Ghulam Muhammad had made up his mind to dissolve the Assembly (McGrath, 1996:130). When Bogra landed at the Karachi airport on 23rd October, 1954, he was taken into custody by a couple of Pakistani generals and escorted to the Governor-General's house while his wife was refrained to join her husband. On the same evening, Bogra was required to attend a meeting with the Governor-General while Iskandar Mirza, Ayub and Choudhry Muhammad Ali had to join as well. Ayub Khan noted that the Governor-General was in highly aggressive mood, abused everyone in the meeting (McGrath, 1996:131) and proposed for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and handing over the power to the military which was declined by Ayub Khan (Ahmad, 1960:4). Finally, the Prime Minister had to agree upon the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

On the 24th of October, the Governor-General issued the proclamation which though did not contain any specific citation meant for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly nevertheless mentioned that it had lost its representative character. A new cabinet was constituted in which the portfolio of Defense Minister was assigned to the serving Commander-in-Chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan which was an indication to the politicians and the public at large that the action taken by the Governor-General had support, approval and sanction of the armed forces. Moreover, Malik Ghulam Muhammad imposed censorship on the press and a ban, under Section 144 Cr.P.C., was also imposed on public meetings for two months. Meanwhile, the Deputy President of the Assembly and the Hindu Opposition Leader were refused entry into the Assembly building guarded by police force which implicitly meant that the Constituent Assembly stood dissolved (McGrath, 1996:132-3). Justice Mir Khuda Bakhsh Murree commented on the post-dissolution situation in an interesting way. "If anyone should care to look back to all headlines of the so called "National Press" of that time, he will find that a bunch of ever-green, self-seeking flatterers, businessmen and politicians, in fact went to

the extent of publicly calling him (Ghulam Muhammad) the “Saviour of the Nation”, and profusely garlanded him.....(Murree, 1990:11)”.

The Legal Battle

The arbitrary dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was accepted invariably by all the Muslim Leaguers except Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the President of the Assembly, who decided to fight the legal battle. In his autobiography “The Test of Time-my life and days”, Mr. Tamizuddin notes that although his residence at Bath Eye Land, Karachi, was guarded by police but keeping incognito, he managed to quit from the back door and reach the Sindh Chief Court in motor rikshaw. Before he could file the writ petition, Iskandar Mirza along with Mr. Naqvi and Mr. M.B. Ahmad, the Commissioner of Karachi and the Secretary, Constituent Assembly, respectively, tried to persuade him until the last moment not to file the same; nevertheless, it was filed on November 7, 1954, through Manzar Alam Advocate (Khan, 1989:151-2) under the title *Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan versus Federation of Pakistan* wherein the Sindh Chief Court decided unanimously in favor of Mr. Tamizuddin Khan. The order for the restoration of the Constituent Assembly was challenged in the Federal Court by the Federation of Pakistan but before challenging it, Ghulam Muhammad maneuvered the composition of the Federal Court to make certain the achievement of the desired verdict from the Federal Court (Ahmad, 2004: 177-8). Furthermore, during the hearing of the case in the Federal Court, Ghulam Muhammad remained in contact with Justice Munir (Shahab, 1987:654). Justice A.R. Cornelius, too, revealed that Ghulam Muhammad had influenced the Judges to decide the case in favor of the Government (McGrath, 1996:196). In the end, Justice Cornelius did prove his distinction and recorded an elaborate dissenting judgment but his lone dissension could not stop the majority decision in favour of the federal government who validated the dissolution order (*for a complete detail of that legal battle please consult 'Role of Judiciary in the Constitutional and Political Development of Pakistan-A Compilation of Important Constitutional Cases', op. cit.*).

The Role of Politicians in Early Politics (1947-1954)

The All India Muslim League was not a political party in its strict sense but rather could gain a status that of a political movement. Jinnah had not enough time either before or after 1947 to transform this movement into a well-organized and disciplined political party. Any system of election within the party for various offices including the membership of the Council was not introduced rather the same were appointed/nominated by Jinnah himself; which pattern still (August 2023) continues to be followed by not only various segments of the Muslim League rather almost all the political parties including Pakistan Peoples Party and many others. For instance, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot was nominated as the President of the Punjab Muslim League and the Chief Minister of the province as well. Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana, being enough ambitious did not accept the same and was always up to weaken and dislodge the newly installed ministry. Jinnah called both of them to Karachi to settle their accounts but to no avail. Had the Muslim League adopted some method in which the provincial and central leadership would have been elected by the party organization at its respective levels, such kind of strife and leg-pulling could have been very well avoided.

East Bengal, known as East Pakistan after 1955, was culturally and linguistically a compact region containing 56% of the country’s total population including Hindus who comprised 25% of the population of that province and shared almost everything with the Muslims except religion. The Muslim League and the establishment, from the very

beginning, could not appreciate the complexity and delicacy of that demographic fact and failed to bring the Bengali Hindus (14% of the country's total population) into the mainstream line of national politics. Bengali, having quite rich literary traditions, was one of the most developed and celebrated languages of India which was written, spoken and comprehended by the Bengalis irrespective of their faith and religion. The linguistic controversy which reached its climax after the establishment of Pakistan was none of a new phenomenon. As early as 1937, during Muslim League's annual session at Lucknow, Abul Hashim, a vehement Bengali leader, contested the case of Bengali language when Urdu was declared and adopted as the official language of the Muslim League. At that time, he was silenced by Jinnah but the same was not a proper answer to the question raised by Abul Hashim rather was tantamount to sweeping the dust under the carpet. Some scholars believe that, in March 1948, Jinnah was misguided by his deputies to the effect that the demand to declare Bengali as one of the state languages was made by a small group of anti-Pakistan elements influenced by the Hindu Bengalis. After declaring Urdu as the only national language and facing un-ignorable opposition, Jinnah realized that he was misinformed which he also put in his personal note but by then it was too late because the things had already taken their natural course. Jinnah being fully exhausted to expire in September that year had no time to revisit and address the problem. There was substantial disagreement and difference of opinion rather clash of vested interests among the Bengali and the Punjabi political elite whereas the latter had the support and blessing of the establishment dominated by the Punjabis and Urdu-speaking migrants hence reaching over any agreement on the issues like the quantum of provincial autonomy, mode of representation in the federal legislature, unicameral or bicameral legislature etc. became virtually impossible. Sharp differences over these issues, among the Muslim League leadership in the East Bengal Provincial Assembly and its leadership in the Constituent Assembly, not only deprived the League of its national and representative character rather culminated into the growth of various political parties in East Bengal which were divided and further cross-divided over these issues thus resulting in the emergence of regionalist organizations playing their own fiddles. On the part of the politicians, frequent shifting of loyalties without realizing their fateful repercussions resulted in the paralysis of the political system at the centre which reduced the party to a loose Federation of provincial groupings more amenable to the Government control than to party high commands which was almost non-existent. Resultantly, the history witnessed the role of the Muslim League Council just as a helpless spectator at the frequent cabinet reshuffles, the dismissal of the Khawaja Nazimuddin and even at the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly itself (Ahmad, 1970:140).

After the defeat of ruling Muslim League in Bengal, there was a constant demand from almost all the Bengal-based political parties that the Constituent Assembly must be dissolved as it had lost its representative character. On the other hand, the Punjabi elite were apprehensive that the Bengali majority in the Parliamentary Party would impose its own Constitution, hence were preparing to enforce a Constitution suitable to them through an executive decree. It is believed that the Constituent Assembly was dissolved to put the said plan into action which was frustrated by the order of the Federal Court wherein the Court validated the dissolution of the Assembly but refrained the Governor-General to legislate at his own and declared that the same was the sole jurisdiction of the forthcoming Constituent Assembly which by no means belonged to the Governor-General in that capacity.

Another sketch of the character of the Cabinet Ministers of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party might be drawn by considering the fact that the Parliamentary

support for Government was managed by bestowing ministerial offices and pecuniary benefits on the members. Most of the ministers of the cabinet lacked the public support hence fearful of facing public opinion. The fact that during the period of 1947 to 1954, nearly one-third of the Ministers were drawn from outside the Assembly, showed the poverty of talent in the parliament's ranks and also the subservience of the cabinet to the Government. After Liaquat's death, the Muslim League had ceased to exist as an organization because neither it had any program nor the leadership and following (Ahmad, 1970:176-7).

Keith Callard commented on the politics of that time in the following words:

"In Pakistan politics is made up of a large number of leading persons, who with their political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Consequently rigid adherence to a policy or a measure is likely to make a politician less available for office. Those who lacked fixed ideas but who control legislators, money or influence have tended to prosper (Callard, 1968:67)."

Conclusion

The British India was divided into "regulation" and "non-regulation" administrative provinces depending upon the socio-political condition and awareness of the masses. The people in "regulation" provinces were enjoying a better protocol and liberties from the administrative machinery whereas this machinery was more powerful in the "non-regulation" provinces where the public was allowed to participate in political activities at a lesser extent. The British regarded East Bengal as a "regulation" province while the provinces in the western wing of Pakistan were all regarded as administrative provinces. Jinnah left the country in initial stages of its growth due to his eternal departure with no suitable candidate to fill his vacuum. The pro-western elements in the ruling corridors of the country remained active from the very beginning. On national level, the politicians had not developed such culture wherein the collective/national interest was to be supreme and preferred viz. a viz. the individual interest, while due to the low level of political consciousness among the electorates there was no check from their relevant constituencies. The international actors, more concerned with the region due to its strategic significance and substantial role in the Cold War scenario, found the situation favorable to fulfill their designs leaving alone the contention that the same was their own creation nevertheless managed by their local clients under the doctrine of neocolonialism; in fact, they just needed a Government at the federal level which, at their instance, could act immediately and fulfill their demands in a better way. There is sufficient evidence that Liaquat, though not a leader of a very high caliber, was resisting the unconditional/unqualified submission to the US line of action, hence was eliminated by the internal state actors in collaboration with their international counterparts. After Liaquat's assassination those elements were systematically brought into power who had little concern with the collective national interest and had assured their utmost faithfulness and loyalties to the dominant international actors (like USA, UK) and their strategic designs. (see *The American Role in Pakistan, op. cit.*). This contention was very well proved when Pakistan under Ayub Khan provided the US an Airbase at Budhabeer to the utter disregard of antagonizing the erstwhile USSR and subsequently when she volunteered to be used as the front-line state at the eve of soviet intervention in Afghanistan during the Zia regime of 1980s and the US War against Terror during Musharraf regime of early 21st century.

The Parliamentary form of Government was adopted in Pakistan but without any tendency to internalize its basis characteristics. The change of Government and parties

had remained practice of the day. The attitude of the politicians lacked political ethics. India, despite all her cultural and racial diversities, succeeded to frame its Constitution within a short time span of almost two years whereas in Pakistan, the leadership engaged in petty strife was unable to reach consensus or at least the minimum consensus to frame such a basic/foundational document under which a viable political system could be introduced and evolved. The Constituent Assembly, allegedly under personal motives of the persons involved, tried to enforce some Parliamentary practices, was thrown into the dust-bin. Tamizuddin Khan, a person blessed with at least some positive repute, tried to get it restored through Courts but the contemporary administration represented by civil-military bureaucratic elite demonstrated its power and all efforts made by him went in vain. It was the beginning of the complete ruining of a system which continues to have its impacts on the country as long as up to the present day (August 2023). Unfortunately, all the patterns and trends discussed above are still very much prevalent in the body politic of the country. A modernized, vibrant and dynamic educational system equally available for all the citizens of Pakistan is the way forward to get rid of this dominance.

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