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Interplay of Religion and Politics: A Historical Account of Islamization and State Discourses in Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

The role of religion in Pakistan is evident at multi-levels ranging from nation and state building processes to shaping informal categorization of citizens and directing national security strategy. The research primarily assumes that politicization of religion by 'power elite' is one of the key dynamics of Islamization in Pakistan. This research aims to investigate the key research question; What role has Islamization played in evolution of state discourse and transformation of relationship between state and society in Pakistan. The endurance of colonial state structures and authoritarian tendencies in post-partition period in Pakistan led to provide grounds for non-representative state institutions and power elite to use religion as a political tool to legitimize their rule while discouraging political and ethnic power claims based on electoral and democratic politics. The underlying study is qualitative and employs explanatory approach. This study recommends that without incorporating socio-economic justice; a critical part of philosophy of an Islamic state, Islamization in Pakistan will only serve the political purposes and vested interests of power elite. The viable means is to transform Pakistan an Islamic state in to declaring socio-economic justice as the key goal rather than regulating society with no transparency and accountability on the part of governments and regimes.

| **KEYWORDS** | Islamization, Military, Pakistan, Politics, Religion, Society, State Discourses |

Introduction

The rise of British control concluded the complete loss of Muslim political power in Sub-Continent. There were largely four institutional responses by Muslims to Christian rule known as "modernist (Aligarh), reformism (Deobandi), traditionalism (Barelvi) and Islamism (Jamaat-I-Islami movements)" (Talbot, 1998). However, in pre-partition era, Indian Muslims were primarily divided in the back drop of their political, social and cultural insecurities. Initially, on a broader and organizational level, these insecurities were addressed by Aligarh and Deobandi traditions by their attempts of educating and reforming Indian Muslim society. Aligarh comparatively incorporated a balanced approach by espousal of western philosophies of modernity while conserving the Muslim identity. Aligarh largely represented by modernist forces nurtured the demand for Pakistan which was generally opposed by Islamists and Deobandi. Deobandi tradition straightaway rejected the western notion while viewing these as source of deviance of religious orthodoxy while for Islamists, establishment of a secular state was blasphemous to religious principles (Pande, 2005). Deobandi school of thought (a revivalist movement) in response to colonial subjugation conserved an uneasy acceptance of an alien rule while viewing it as a transitory condition. They prioritized cleansing of the religious thought from practices of corruption, deviation or innovation

generally known as 'Bida' while advocating a puritanical version of religion (Karamat, et. al. 2019)

The divisions among Muslim community continued regarding their identity, nationhood and political approaches to purse constitutional rights during the last decade of Independence movement in United India. Jalal (1990) expounded that assertion of religious identity by Jinnah was merely his effort to bring solidarity & unity among the divided Muslim constituents & to secure the general support rather than as a result of any commitment to Islamic ideology or a strategic device to defeat his rivals. She stated that the lack of consensus over territorial and ideological was quite evident at the time of establishment of Pakistan (p:16). These disagreements were largely represented by three groups of Muslims in United India. First group of Muslims while advocating the territorial nationalism were associated with All India National Congress (AINC). Second group was primarily in support of All India Muslim League (AIML) under the leadership of Jinnah. The AIML largely believed in enhancing the separate identity of Muslims which was ostensibly in danger due to potential dominance of Hindu majority in United India. This led them to call for political and constitutional safeguards through a possible federal political system in United India which gradually shaped the demand of establishment of a separate state for Muslims. The third group was largely comprised of religious political parties, organizations and orthodox clergy largely from Jamiat-Ulema-e-Hindh (JUH). They had concerns for Muslim rights and identity similar of All India Muslim League however, were highly critical of AIML's demand of a separate Muslim state based on western notion of Nation-state contradicting to their idea of 'Ummah' (Haider, 2011). Syed Abul Ala Maududi was one of those key theologians in South Asia who clearly opposed the idea of Pakistani state while viewing the notion of nation state contrary to Khilafat. Furthermore, he explicated that in the backdrop of complex demographic realities of the proposed state, neither it would be possible to transform it into an Islamic state nor could it protect the interests of all Muslims of Sub-Continent. Despite all opposition of most of Muslim religious elite of British India to the idea of Pakistan, in post-Independence milieu, many among them became protagonists for modeling Pakistan an Islamic state (Khan, 2011).

The election results of 1945-46 consolidated the political claims of A.IML as sole representative of Muslims as well as demonstrated the unopposed leadership of Jinnah to speak on the behalf of the Muslims of United India. It has been provided that many of Leaders of AIML including Jinnah were secular in their personal beliefs however Islamic identity was provoked to make their political claims valid and acceptable to the larger portion of Muslim voters (Sayeed, 1968:198-9). The role of Islam and vision of a separate Muslim state throughout the independence movement never remained consistent or pronounced in a uniform way. This was largely manifested by prevailing circumstances and nature of alliances in United India where Jinnah and other Muslim elite were trying to deal with a possible post-colonial constitutional arrangement (Haider, 2011: 115).

Literature Review

Jelen (1995) explicates that religion can work both ways either to serve and support the political culture or to undermine it. The contribution and role of religion depends on the political process as well as on the particular group who uses it. It also depends on the nature of the political system and the kind of political culture exercised in a given society. Kokosalakis (1985) advocates that religion and politics cannot be separated even in the modern non-religious or secular societies as political authority still requires a cultural frame in which it can be defined and its claim can be accepted. The legitimacy of power in the state is just not only a matter of procedure but also a question of values,

meaning and political purpose. Geertz (1973) supports this view by expounding that "thrones may be out of fashion but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claim, and so does opposition to it. A world holy demystified is a world holy depoliticized." Davis (1994) discusses the impacts of religion on social structure in detail. While discussing the present social functions of religion, he expounds that the role of religion in a modern polity and state structures is almost diminished. However, it is still a cultural and spiritual force which has the ability to manifest the ideological beliefs of the governed and to mobilize them in a violent manner. Weber (1978) expresses that in most of states, religious and political institutions are interconnected. However, the level of connectivity varies in different political systems. He describes the relation between religious and secular power under three types i.e. "hierocratic, theocratic and caesaropapism." The hierocratic model is where secular power is dominated but covered in "religious legitimacy". In theocratic type the clerical authority is dominant and the caesaropapism model is the one where the head of the state takes the highest position in church and judiciary. Pande (2005) identifies that if any religion gains "establishment status" in religiously heterogeneous societies it might in a way activate some kind of religious conflict. It stands relevant even for single faith nations with "religious monolith societies" as some sort of differences or disagreements might exist to activate some sort of religious or sectarian conflict despite their religious homogeneity.

There are some of the writers who illustrate the efforts of Muslim intellectuals and activists for Islamic revivalism in sub-continent. Pearson (1979), Mortimer (1982) and Nichols (2001) describe Islamic movements that were aimed at purification of Muslims from the influence of non-Muslims. Lodhi (2011) identifies the religious division as one of the five major and correlated fault lines in the polity of Pakistan which is a potential threat to national unity. Due to the sectarian differences religion, which is supposed to cement the nation and its raison d'etre, is more and more divided. Kennedy (1992), (1996) is of the view that policies to "Islamize" the political system of Pakistan created differences of opinion even among Islamists. Islamic activists believed in expansion of Islamic principles and laws in all fields of human activity while Islamic modernists wanted a restrictive role of religion in state activities. Islamic activists could not achieve much success in early years of Pakistan but General Zia-ul-Haq's regime proved amenable to their demands.

In the backdrop of overview of existing literature, this research connects the development of Islam as a constitutional and political subject with the relationship of state and society of Pakistan.

Discussion

The divisions among the Muslims regarding their identity, political and constitutional means were not diminished even in post-partition scenario in Pakistan. One of the key disagreements was lack of consensus over the nature of state as Islamic or secular. The advocates of a secular Pakistan referred to the speech of Jinnah at Constituent assembly on August 11, 1947 as the inclusive message of father of the nation. Jinnah just three days before the establishment of Pakistan explicated that the religious faith of citizens are their personal matters with complete religious freedom whereas it has nothing to do with the business of state. In 1948, Jinnah again asserted the idea of an inclusive state while stating that "Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission (Ahsan, 1996). We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christians and Parsis- but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same right and privileges as any other citizen and the majority, i.e., Bengali Muslims and there remained no justification for the existence of Pakistan" (Pande, 2005: 145-6). Although, Jinnah was trying to maintain a delicate balance between his secular mind-set advocating the equal

rights for all citizens irrespective of their religious beliefs and also satisfying the religio-nationalist aspirations of majority. In another instance, while writing to a religious leader on the issue of role of Islam in constitution, Jinnah carefully explained the potential Islamic aspect of Pakistani state. He stated that "It is needless to emphasize that Constituent Assembly, which would be predominantly Muslim, in its composition, would be able to enact laws for Muslims, not inconsistent with the sharia laws, and the Muslims will no longer be obliged to abide by the un-Islamic laws" (Pirzada, 1997:44). Haider (2011) identifies that in Pakistani society the struggle between the different sections of society dates back to the divergent path of Aligarh and Deobandi traditions adopted to reform Muslim society. This is quite relevant as in contemporary Pakistani society, there are people who embrace conception of modernity and religion and also exit those who pursue redemption in their professed Islamic fundamentalism.

The pressure to Islamize the polity and state emphasized more in post-Jinnah period. One of the initial key instances of incorporating religion into political and constitutional spaces was establishment of Board of Islamic Teaching by the first Constituent Assembly to provide advice on outline of Objective Resolution. The respective Board provided that provisions are required to make in Constitution to ensure that such bills, laws, ordinances or any other administrative order that contradicts Shariah would be immediately nullified or considered void. Furthermore, they suggested that a committee be formed of experts on Islamic laws to agree whether or not any law, bill or legal document is against the requirements of Shariah (Binder, 1961: 386). The primacy of Islamic ideology in constitutional development was apparent when in Objective Resolution of 1949, the values of freedom, democracy; tolerance and equality were conditioned with the idea of compatibility of Islamic notion. Moreover, religious minorities raised their objections while walking out of the Constituent Assembly at the time of passage of resolution. Religious minorities also opposed the idea of separate electorates during the discussions at assembly in 1950s. Before the Objective Resolution, Pakistan and Islam were significantly associated by various means however, the respective resolution legitimized the political instrumentalization of religion in politics by making it a core theme of State discourse which in later decades especially under military regimes enhanced the authoritarian nature of Pakistani state as well its vigorous control over society.

Roots of Constraints to Political and Religious Dissent in Pakistan

The writings of Maududi as a part of Deobandi tradition and his political party; JI shaped the mindset of many among Muslims in South Asia especially in Pakistan while playing a significant role in Muslim awakening. The main theme of his writing revolves around unity of religion and politics as a complete code of life while surpassing all other social philosophies and western ideas. His written texts led to shape two issues; the status of religious minorities in an Islamic state and compulsions of a Muslim under a non-Muslim state. He was of the view that in an Islamic state, religious minority cannot be treated equally which discarded any possibility of principle of Plurality. Whereas, a Muslim in an un-Islamic state is bound to establish Allah's sovereignty by all possible peaceful means. He further stressed that when strong enough, a Muslim under a non-Muslim state has duty to liberate all territories which were once under Muslim control (Maududi, 1966: 22-3, Maududi, 1962: 575-83, Maududi, 1988: 101,119). This led to manifest thinking among the followers of Deobandi tradition that there are fewer prospects of co-existence and harmony between Muslim and non-Muslim.

In the backdrop of rising demands of Islamization by the Islamist parties and groups, spaces for disagreements and dissent were quite narrow even in the initial

decade in Pakistan. This was evident by the fact that Sayyid Abu-Ala Maududi was imprisoned due to his stance of not supporting Jihad in Indian Occupied Kashmir. Maududi was of the view that may be Kashmiri consider it as Jihad however due to prevailing peace between both countries; this is not the case of Jihad for Pakistan (Pande, 2005:146). The threats to pluralistic Pakistani society were also perceptible in 1953 due to apparent fallouts of political use of Islam. State writ was challenged by street protest with a demand of declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslims and removal of Sir Zafarullah Khan; the first foreign minister of Pakistan for being an Ahmadi. In response to the anti-Ahmadis riots, the Munir Report of 1954 clearly warned about the ostensible offshoot of use of religious ideology as political narrative. The respective report prepared by two judges of Federal Court; Justice Munir and Justice Kiyani advised government to refrain from declaring the respective sect as non-Muslim to preserve the inclusive polity of Pakistani state. Report highlighted that use of state authority to define the credentials of Muslims would widen the divisions while stimulating the probabilities of apostasy allegations (Report of Court of Inquiry, 1953: 215-18). Such advice was also provided by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (Prime Minister 1956-57) as he argued that emphasis on religious ideology "would keep alive within Pakistan the divisive communal emotions by which the subcontinent was riven before the achievement of independence." He advocated for a durable identity largely resultant of larger consensus of government and its people (Suhrawardy, 1957:425). Jacob (2007) highlighted that during the anti-Ahmadi riots, politicians in aid with bureaucracy learned about using religion against citizens whereas Judiciary remained destitute (p: 200). He also provided that many among the active religious minority leadership preferred to concede to a Muslim state with an expectation of accommodation. He cited the example of Justice A.R. Cornelius who supported the enforcement of Islamic laws in Pakistani state while perceiving, no threat to the rights of minorities. He further identifies that a significant section of leadership of religious minorities did not take into account the potential political use of Islam in Pakistan (p: 201).

De-legitimization of Political Players and Opponents

In Pakistan, Islam has been used either to delegitimized political opponents or potential opposition or critics from civil society. This was case when under military regime of Ayub Khan, a fatwa (a religious declaration by some religious scholars) issued to politically discredit the presidential candidate; Fatima Jinnah. This so-called religious statement explicated that under Islamic political system, a woman is not allowed to head an Islamic state. Similar kinds of attempts were made during 1980s under Zia regime to discredit Benazir Bhutto. Under the Yahya khan, key political parties; Pakistan People's Party (socialist) and Awami league (secular) were targeted by religious political parties with the support of Intelligence agencies while calling former as un-Islamic. During the war of 1971, state elite projected the assertion of Bengali identity contrary to Islamic identity of Pakistani state while discrediting the Bengali culture for having dominant reflections of Hinduism. Furthermore, while perceiving war of 1971 as struggle for Islamic identity of Pakistan, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) remained in corporation with paramilitary forces and counterinsurgency wings in East Pakistan (Haider, 2011:118).

Projection of Political Narrative of Islam to address Issues of National Integration

In Pakistan, Islamic ideology remained a key factor in top-down nationalist project where many among the state elite despite their secular orientations addressed the challenges of national integrations and political, ethnic disagreements through systematic incorporation of Islamic ideology in constitutional and political discourses of state. This religio-political resolution while addressing many of issues of national

integrity was also apparent in education. Government sponsored text books overlooked the idea of Pakistan as a result of post-colonial constitutional struggle of power sharing. These educational materials largely ignored the notion of provincial autonomy as key driving force of Pakistan rather it exclusively focused the religious identity as the only reason of creation of Pakistan. While portraying the sole purpose of Pakistan to emerge as an Islamic state, state elite discredited the shared history and heritage of Pakistani state rooted in Sub-Continent.

In the backdrop of separation of Eastern wing of Pakistani state in 1971 and years of military rule, the political narrative of Pakistani state based on Islam became quite extraneous for the time being. The new populist discourse of Pakistani politics was built on socialist rhetoric of PPP. It was pointed out that separation of culturally diverse and heterogeneous Eastern wing made remaining Pakistani state a compact entity where religion was not needed to bind the state. However, Prime Minister Bhutto transformed his ideas of socialism as Islamic Socialism; the defining manifesto of his party to deal with the opposition which were largely religious and ethnic political parties. Bhutto was quite a liberal person with significantly western life style though he incorporated several polices provoking Islamization. Ban on gambling, alcohol & making Friday as off day were the symbolic steps of Islamization under Bhutto. The underlying reason was an attempt to portray his image as a good Muslim in response to the criticism of opposition. Moreover, Gen. Zia's authoritarian tendencies, less reliance on democratic processes and lack of will to reconcile with ethnic political forces provided enough space to religious right-wing political parties to formulate an effective alliance against him while providing an alternate national narrative. The constitutional amendment of 1974 under Prime Minister Bhutto to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims was also the result of the fact that he was reluctant to stand up to the street protests by religious political parties. Moreover, his steps like; appointing a minister of religious affairs to the central cabinet very first time in Pakistan and inviting the Imams of Holy sites; Ka'ba and Masjid-e-Nabvi Medina in 1976 for a visit to Pakistan were intended to improve his Islamic credentials Bhutto also extended his Islamization rhetoric into foreign policy of Pakistan by hosting the OIC conference at Lahore and calling potential Pakistani nuclear weapons as Islamic bomb (Haider, 2011: 120). This authenticated the earlier attempts of state elite to disconnect Pakistan from its historical roots and shared history in South Asia while reorienting the state towards the region of Middle East.

Though Gen. Zia regime's Islamization was also for the legitimacy of his rule however it did not remain symbolic. Unlike Gen. Ayub Khan and Gen. Yahya who figuratively utilized Islam for all-encompassing nationalist project, Gen. Zia while portraying himself as a 'solider of Islam' clearly conditioned survival of Pakistan with implementation of an Islamic system. He expounded that "Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country" (Rizvi, 1986:289-93). In contrast to the previous phases of Islamization, under Gen. Zia the respective process was a revolutionary one leading to overhauling of Pakistani state and society. General. Zia's desire for a radical change not only in state policy but at societal level through his personal religious beliefs was echoed when he stated that, "In last thirty years in general but more so in the last seven years there has been a complete erosion of moral values of our society…. Islam from that point of view is the fundamental factor" (Haider, 2011:122).

Impact of Islamization on Pakistani Military

Under Gen. Zia as the army Chief, the slogan of Pakistani military was altered as faith, piety and Jihad fi Sabil Allah (Jihad for the sake of God). Furthermore, in the forms for the evaluation of military officers, a box of comments for their religious sincerity included. Additionally, the links between Deobandi Tablighi Jamat and military personnel were also increased significantly. During 1980s, in the backdrop of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and Pakistan's involvement through proxy war, Pakistani military came into close contact with proxy Islamist groups. Zia regime with international aid specific from United States and Saudi Arab cultivated religiously inspired mind-set both in Pakistan and Afghanistan to transform a limited resistance against Soviet Union into a full-scale Jihad. Funds flow from U.S. & Saudi Arab facilitated the process of religious indoctrination in Pakistan. It is reported that from 1984-1994, as a part of US covert efforts, US Agency for International Development provided a grant of almost 51 million $ to University of Nebraska-Omaha & its Centre of Afghanistan Studies to develop text books which included the militant Islamic teaching with violent images to provoke anti-Soviet resistance (Stephens, J., & Ottaway, D. B. 2002, March 23). It was provided by Milt Beardn; CIA station Chief in Pakistan (1986-89), that U.S. & Saudi Arab funneled approximately 3.5 billion $ in Afghanistan & Pakistan during the Afghan war ((Muzaffar, , et. al 2021; Stern,2000). The ISI collaborated with right-wing political parties like Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam and JI to recruit students at religious Madrasahs in Pakistan and Afghan refugees. This led to develop deep penetration of Wahhabi thoughts within the Pakistani society, military and intelligence agency; ISI. In later decades, ISI remained in contact with Taliban and its associated organization like Haqqani Network for strategic advantages in the region. The founder of the Haqqani network; Jalaluddin Haqqani was called Haqqani with reference to the madrasah 'Darul Ullom Haqqania located in KPK, Pakistan. The respective religious school was also known as 'University of Jihad' where many of Taliban leaders including Mullah Omer trained.

The Islamization policies under Zia regime ominously developed an informal alliance between military elite and religious parties. In post-Zia era, ISI backed IJI to target the political leadership specifically Benazir Bhutto on the grounds that under Islam, a woman neither can rule an Islamic state nor can defend the national and ideological boundaries of Pakistan. Though under Musharraf regime, Pakistani military decisively curbed Al Qaeda however, did not break links with Taliban and its allied organizations as these were viewed as strategic assets for Pakistan in Afghanistan and Indian held-Kashmir.

Proliferation of Jihadi Culture: An Existential Militant Threat to Pakistan

Zia regime backed the growth of madrasahs however, did not consider any possible consequences or gave any thought to the future consumption of madrasah graduates in any employment sector (Muzaffar, et. al. 2017; Khan, 2011). General Zia encouraged establishment of Madrasahs for two key purposes; first as a mean to patronage religious political parties to secure legitimacy and secondly to recruit volunteers to participate in anti-Soviet war. Initially these religious schools were financed by Zakat (money collected by government from Muslim population due to their religious obligations to purify the wealth and giving it to poor) but later individuals like industrialists in Pakistan and non-governmental organizations from Persian Gulf specifically from Iran and Saudi Arab started funding. The unchecked flow of funds empowered these religious schools to propagate a violent and narrow version of religion. In 2000, out of around 40000 madrasahs, only 4350 were registered. Furthermore, organizations like Lashker-e-Taiba used to raise its funds on internet with anonymous donations. The most distressing fact about these Madrasahs was that while focusing only

on religious education, they ignored science, math and other secular subjects related to the development of human mind and thought; significant to a modern society. In 1960, a book 'The first Principles of Islamic state' by Maududi provided that "those who choose the theological branch of learning generally keep themselves utterly ignorant of secular subjects, thereby remaining incapable of giving any lead to the people regarding modern political problems". These madrasahs illustrated jihad with guerrilla warfare rather than an ongoing inner process of striving for purification of self and justice in one's role. These religious schools specifically targeted the groups of population who were unemployed and lacked technical education or skills to find jobs. These unemployed were brainwashed that fighting against non-Muslims or Muslims from other sects contrary to their beliefs is the religious obligation. The unrestricted flow of money from national and international sources in the name of protecting the religion provided the Jihad movement a financial momentum which made drugs and guns most important business in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Before the Afghan war, Pakistanis were generally not very familiar with Wahhabi or Salafi creed. Salafi Islam was much disseminated by Deobandi tradition in Pakistan in the backdrop of their close contact in the wake of Afghan war. Both school of thoughts view jihad as a common principle and mean for two of their goals; first to restore the Muslim power and secondly to strictly interpret Quran in its literal sense. Haider (2011) ascertains four key factors as underlying reasons for amassed popularity of Wahhabi and Deobandi views of religion since 1970s in Pakistan. (Muzaffar, , et. al 2021). First; in the wake of oil boom in Middle East, the Wahhabi ideology was imported by Pakistani workers belonged to middle class who resided in Saudi Arab or other Gulf states. Second was revival of Pan-Islamism in Pakistan in the wake of Saudi attempts to constrain Iranian influences while aggressively proliferating Wahhabi thoughts in Pakistan. Thirdly, Saudi funding flows into Pakistan led to the mushroom growth of madrasahs primarily teaching Wahhabi school of thought and multiplying its adherents. Fourth, Pakistani society was already experiencing a conservative form of Islam in certain economically weak classes and in altered socio-economic milieu, Wahhabi traditions got more acceptance among the masses.

The spread of Wahhabism in Pakistan as result of role of Islamization in domestic and foreign policy decisions led them to declare the other moderate versions of Islam like Sufism as immoral. In later decades in Pakistan, the idea of jihad by many Islamist groups did not confine to the enemies outside the state or at boarders as sectarian tendencies led many militant groups to target Pakistani state and its officials when any attempt was made to restrict their actions. This was the case when in 1999, a Sunni sectarian group; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi attempted to assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif. Additionally, since 2005, there was dramatic increase in recruitment and growth of Madrasahs in Punjab. The underlying reason was enhanced influx of foreign money in the form of Islamic charity apparently for the earthquake relief measures in Kashmir and KPK which was diverted towards Punjab to expand Deobandi influence in the province (RACIMORA, 2013). Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), Lashkare-e-Jangvi (LeJ), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) & Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) are such militant outfits largely supported by military led establishment thrived in Southern part of Punjab in the backdrop of unemployment & poverty. The recruitment for such militant groups stemmed from almost 300 madrasahs located in Punjab. The militant groups which received unprecedented state patronage under Zia regime grew tremendously in power, size, resources, networking and transnational connections. In post-Zia period, they gradually turned their weapons inwards by targeting other sectarian groups and Pakistani state while time to time pressurizing Pakistani governments to make peace deals with them. These peace deals showed inability of Pakistani governments to tackle

those who consistently challenged state writ, attacked on state buildings, innocent citizens and damaged public properties. Secondly, such peace deals somehow legitimized these militant organizations and respective demands while enhancing their bargain position. In contemporary scenario, many of these militant organizations view Pakistani state as enemy of Islam and one of the key hurdles to establish an Islamic order. The underlying reason for increasing potential of these militant organizations is that many of these are nurtured on state expense and public money. Furthermore, the ungoverned spaces in Pakistani state and inability of governments to provide basic necessities of life, economic opportunities and justice led these militant outfits and Islamist groups to proclaim their actions as a mean to return to religious purity and to replace Pakistani state. The enforcement of Shariah law in Swat by TTP in 2009 was initially supported by people due to lack of an effective system of justice & economic monopoly of landed classes. While gradually increasing its influence through series of agreements with Pakistani government for an exchange for enforcement of Islamic law, TTP claimed that democracy is not at all suitable system in state & this reflected the militant groups' ideological & territorial assertions against the Pakistani state (Khan,2011). Moreover, Pakistani state pronounced Islam as national narrative and justified some of its foreign policy and domestic decisions in the name of religious cause with significant focus on Jihad since 1970s which disordered the Pakistani society.

An appropriate example of Islamization policies and respective off-shots was demonstrated by Lal (Red) Mosque debacle in July 2007. In mid-1960s, an adherent of Deobandi tradition; Maulana Muhammad Abdullah was appointed chief Cleric of respective mosque under Ayub regime. He enjoyed enlargement of his influence and power beyond the mosque during Zia regime in the wake of Afghan Jihad due to his role in recruitment of mujahedin for Islamic resistance against Soviet Union. Later, flow of funding from local sources and abroad enabled him to establish two madrasahs on encroached land affiliated with the mosque. He also remained associated with Jihadi organizations active in Kashmir. After his assassination in 1998 as result of emergent sectarianism, two of his sons took the charge of the Red Mosque. The two brothers; Abdual Aziz and Abdur Rashid Ghazi vociferously opposed the post-9/11 state policy of Pakistan especially the abandonment of Jihad as a state narrative in their Friday sermons. They also pronounced a fatwa for not giving Islamic funeral to the Pakistani military combatants fighting with Taliban (Khan, 2011). Later, female student from associated madrasahs of Red Mosque; Jamia Hafsa occupied a nearby children library and refused to step back. This action of students was responded through a notice by Capital Development Authority to vacate the encroached land by the clergy of Red mosque which city authorities overlooked for years. In series of events exhibiting aggressive behavior of male students of Jamia Fareedia like kidnapping some policemen and staff member while encroaching into a neighborhood Chinese clinic on alleged prostitution, forcefully closing down the music shops and monitoring the markets by veiled female as well as male students carrying sticks in their hands with led to a crisis situation. Additionally, Abdur Rashid Ghazi in press conference openly confirmed the presence of arms and suicide bombers. Later all efforts by state authorities like engaging both clerics in meeting with civil, military officials, mediation by Imam of Holy Ka'ba and many other influential religious and political leadership proved futile. The crisis concluded on a military operation started on July 10, 2007 against the authorities and students of Red Mosque leading to extensive bloodshed. Red Mosque proved to be a watershed as after few months, militants reorganized and led to cause several terror attacks on government, police and military (Khan, 2011). This depicted that how state patronage and unchecked funding in support of Jihad narrative of state caused a collateral damage to state itself as these militant organizations started acting

independently and violently in defiance of the Pakistani government through the weapons, arms and resources they acquired from the state and its affiliates.

Enlightened Moderation

The varying degrees of Islamization not only expanded the crisis of state to the society under Zia regime but also led Pakistan to a critical crossroad in the backdrop of 9/11.Radicalism and religious extremism became key challenges to Pakistan's national security as well to its moral and diplomatic standing in international community. The resolution to religious extremism was provided as 'Enlightened Moderation' by military ruler; General. Musharraf. His strategy was explicated in January 2002 through an address to nation while rejecting terrorism and fighting against intolerance and extremism. General Musharraf explained his two-pronged strategy where first part was related to Muslim world to collectively discard the religious extremism and militancy while promoting prospects of socio-economic uplift. He also indicated an ambitious plan to form a small group of influential Islamic states to initiate the dialogue between the principal parties to the conflict in Middle Eastern Region. Secondly; he stressed that West and particularly US need to address the political issues like Palestinian conflict with justice and assistance for deprived part of Muslim world (Yaseen, & Muzaffar, 2018; Musharraf, 2004, Khan, 2011).

Gen. Musharraf identified a key distinction between extremism and terrorism. He expounded that force is needed to contain terrorism whereas viewed extremism as a state of mind which must addressed through a reform process (Khan, 2011). The respective 'Enlightened Moderation' at domestic level was reflected in the form of outlawing some of the militant organizations, initiating the process of registration of madrasahs and remodeling the curriculum of these religious schools. However, this approach remained futile as due to deep rooted support for the sectarian and Islamist groups at different state and society level, many of the militant organizations were re-established with new names. Secondly, already weak and deficient public education system of Pakistan became less successful to bring these madrasahs into mainstream education or to address relevant issues of reforming their syllabus. Additionally, due to selective political co-option of Musharraf regime and absence of mainstream political leadership like Ms. Bhutto (PPP) and Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif in general elections (PML-N), religious political parties despite having not more than 12 percent votes were politically empowered to hamper the reform process by asserting their influence beyond numbers.

Conclusion

The study concludes that many of Pakistan's contemporary problems and challenges are significantly linked with the way different political, religious forces and state elite advanced their conceptualization of state while attempting to pursue their contending versions of an Islamic state. The political instrumentalization of religion was started even before the establishment of Pakistan. However, present-day problems of militancy, radicalism and extremism are deeply rooted in late 1970s attributing to several national and international events like arrival of military regime in Pakistan, Iranian revolution and Pakistan's involvement in proxy war against Soviet Union. Additionally, the emergent waves of Islamic revivalism in Arab world largely resultant of Arab-Israel war of 1973 gradually reached to Pakistani society as military regime of General. Zia patronized Jihadi groups in the name of Islam against Soviet Union. The revivalist

tendencies in Muslim world provided fruitful grounds for intensification of Islamization process in Pakistan under a military regime which was already in need of legitimacy. Despite a strong association of majority of Pakistanis with Islam as their key ideology and their potential mobility on religious issues, they generally do not support religious political parties in electoral politics. The possible reason of low electoral support for religious political parties is their association with different religious sects largely contradicting of each other and their inability to agree or shape consensus on single version of Islam.

Pakistani state and society both in post-Islamization period provide twofold scenario. There are significant number of people with radical mind-set and elected civilian governments with constant control of military led establishment largely shaping the direction of state discourse and public policy. Although, politically, socially and ethnic dissent voices are gradually emerging as a robust civil society was seen through Lawyers movement during 2007-9. Pakistani electronic and print media is facing an acute censorship however social media platforms openly and fearlessly express the criticism on sensitive areas of Pakistani politics like civil-military relations and religious radicalization. Pakistani population is comprised of significant portion of moderate Muslims who flatly renounce militancy, religious extremism and terrorist acts. Although, there is substantial number of moderate Muslims who still believe in the notion of unity of Muslim Ummah while viewing US global policy of primacy as the root cause of many of their problems and also see West as the key conspirator against Islam. The most critical off-shoot of Islamization in contemporary Pakistan is shrinking spaces of political and religious dissent which makes Pakistani society less resilient to authoritarian state discourses while transforming a substantial number of Pakistani not religious but radical in their approach to address modern-day problem.

Recommendations

Despite the fact that whatever adverse role political instrumentalization of religion has played in Pakistani politics, religion cannot be diminshed from the political and societal discources. There is need to highlight the critical role of socio-economic justice in pursuance of an Islamic state. The previous Islamization projects were more of Islamizing the society rather than Islamizing the governments. The Islamization of government makes socio-economic justice as a key task while incorporarting the idea that people at the helm of affairs are meant to serve society rather than ruling it. The notion of socio-economic justice directs the focus of the state policies towards addressing the issues such as poverty, inadequate wages, inhumane working conditions, social insecurity, law and order, uplifting marginalized classes rather than merely regulating public and private life of its citizens. The idea of socio-economic justice in Pakistan can only be materialized by initiating a significant focus of state policy towards education by making it a top priority so people of Pakistan may able to differenciate between a government and state. The more educated the people the more they will be able to discard those ideologies and narratives which are not making their lives politically, socially and economically better.

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