Towards Stability: A Theoretical Analysis of Strategic Choices in South Asia’s Deterrence Environment

Abstract

This research investigates strategic stability in South Asia's deterrence landscape post-1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan. Examining nuclear capabilities, it highlights the region's evolving dynamics. Focusing on strategic stability's significance, the study probes India's escalation tendencies and Pakistan's deterrence reliance, fueling discourse on preemptive strategies and first-use doctrines. Using qualitative methodology, it seeks to understand 'strategic stability' and pinpoint factors fostering regional instability. Aligned with neorealism, the research argues that nuclear weapons' dire consequences stabilize the international system. Thus, it offers insights into strategic decision-making, and suggests strategies to bolster stability and avert conflict escalation in South Asia's deterrence framework. As a result, it provides insights into the likelihood of escalation and the challenges posed by differing threat perceptions and capabilities. This study recommends vital insights into South Asia's nuclear dynamics, advocating for measures to enhance stability and mitigate conflict risks.