Great-Power Politics and Institutional Constraints in UN Conflict Management: A Comparative Realist Analysis of Post-2000 Interventions in Kashmir, Palestine, Ukraine, Yemen, and Venezuela

Abstract

This paper discusses institutional barriers that constrain the effectiveness of the United Nations in major conflict zones since the year 2000. UN has been constructed to ensure international peace and justice but inequalities in the makeup of the Security Council are still there to influence decision making. The latest conflicts reveal the interference of geopolitical interests. The study represents a qualitative analysis that uses the Classical and Structural Realist theory by analyzing protracted conflicts, including Kashmir, Palestine, Ukraine, Yemen, and Venezuela, with the complement of institutional and policy document analysis. Results indicate that veto politics often culminates in institutional stasis that prevents the UN to take decisive actions even when there are increasing humanitarian crises. Consent and slows down the resolution of conflict is curtailed by strategic rivalry among the great powers. The research proposes limited vetoes during humanitarian emergencies, more representation of third word states, greater regional co-operation.