Strategic Stability in South Asia: Nuclear Deterrence, Crisis Escalation, and the India–Pakistan Security Dilemma

Abstract

This study examined the determinants of strategic stability in South Asia within the India–Pakistan security dilemma, focusing on nuclear force posture, conventional military asymmetry, emerging military technologies, crisis escalation dynamics, and political leadership risk orientation. South Asia's nuclearized environment, shaped by recurring crises (Kargil 1999, Twin Peaks 2001–02, Balakot 2019), highlights the limits of nuclear deterrence. The stability–instability paradox remains central to the India– Pakistan rivalry. A quantitative cross-sectional survey employed a structured 40-item Likert-scale questionnaire administered to 307 participants in International Relations and Strategic Studies. Descriptive statistics, reliability analysis (Cronbach's Alpha), validity tests (KMO and Bartlett), Pearson correlation, regression, and inferential tests (t- test, ANOVA, Kruskal–Wallis, Chi-square) were applied. All variables exhibited significant positive effects on strategic stability perceptions. Crisis escalation dynamics emerged as the strongest predictor, followed by emerging military technologies and conventional military asymmetry. Findings confirmed the stability–instability paradox. Sustainable stability requires strengthened crisis communication mechanisms, doctrinal transparency, confidence-building measures, and responsible political decision-making by both states.